

CBS TELEVISION STATIONS

A Division of CBS Inc.
51 West 52 Street
New York, New York 10019
(212) 975-6858

D. Thomas Miller, President

Dear Mr. Turner:


March 29, 1977

Certain remarks were made concerning the C.I.A. by Daniel Ellsberg during a segment of the DINAH! program broadcast on March 22, 1977 over the facilities of CBS Television Stations WCBS-TV in New York at approximately 4 p.m., WBBM-TV in Chicago at approximately 3:30 p.m., WCAU-TV in Philadelphia at approximately 4:30 p.m., KMOX-TV in St. Louis at approximately 4:00 p.m., and KNXT in Los Angeles at approximately 6:30 p.m. We enclose a transcript of such remarks and the surrounding context for your convenient reference.

In these circumstances we believe that it is appropriate to offer a representative of the C.I.A. the opportunity to appear on DINAH! in order to have the C.I.A.'s response to the remarks of Mr. Ellsberg transmitted over the facilities of such CBS Television Stations. We have been advised by Winchester, Ltd., the producers of DINAH!, that they are willing for such a representative to make an appearance on DINAH! in order to respond to such remarks.

If the C.I.A. wishes to avail itself of this opportunity, please get in touch with me without delay so that we and representatives of Winchester, Ltd. can discuss with you the length, content, and scheduling of the C.I.A.'s proposed response.

Sincerely,



Mr. Stansfield Turner
Director of the C.I.A.
Washington, D.C. 20505

"DINAH" - Excerpts from interview with Daniel Ellsberg

Ellsberg: I believed what I had been falsely told by the government, what Senator Goldwater has been told as an Air Force General, and believes mistakenly, that there is a law that governs civilians, so I thought I was breaking that law and I thought I'd go to jail forever.

Dinah: And you were willing to do that for your convictions?

Ellsberg: To help end the war.

Dinah: You don't regret what you did?

Ellsberg: Oh no, I wouldn't regret it if I were in jail now. And I'm glad I live in a country where it wasn't against the law to do what I did. I appreciate it...I understand it more now. And I not only understand those rights but I understand the powers of a people in this country that remain. When I said we should trust ourselves...if people in this country hadn't started trusting what they could see on their television... what their sons told them when they came back from Viet Nam... what they read in the newspapers above what the government told them...if they hadn't followed their own common sense and their own values, if they did not want to fight against

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the self-determination of the Vietnamese and bomb them, we'd still be bombing them.... If we trusted the President, we'd still be bombing Viet Nam.

Dinah: Yes, but it was the people who said that we will not...how do you think history will view your act?

Ellsberg: Depends who writes that history.

Dinah: Yes.

Ellsberg: If we should ever undergo the kind of change...to the kind of law, frankly, that Senator Goldwater talked about...a law that would make it criminal, punish people for telling secrets about government misconduct...in other words, if we should change the way Indira Ghandi changed the laws of India very recently, and that is something we have to be vigilant about...that could happen; then what I did and a lot of other people did will be seen then as treason. But if we stay the kind of country that was designed 200 years ago, then I would be glad to be seen as one of a lot of people, an enormous number of people who could recognize a wrongful law and act to help free us from it.

Dinah: Didn't you feel at times...over and above the jail sentence that might threatened you if they did prove that it

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was illegal...that your life might be in danger from people that...

Ellsberg: My wife worried about that....

Dinah: I would worry about that.

Ellsberg: I didn't. You know I had the impression I knew what we did overseas...the stories about coups and assassinations. I'd been in Viet Nam. I'd read the Pentagon Papers which tell about the assassination of Diem in Viet Nam. I knew we did that to foreigners. I thought we didn't do that to Americans. I thought that that kind of illegality stopped at our shores. But I was wrong. We went out here in Los Angeles...I went once in a sports arena in front of an audience of 18,000 people...looked like Woodstock, you know, under one roof...it's amazing.... My wife was very worried. Oh, no they don't do that...but I was wrong. It turned out later that the White House hired 11 Cuban Americans who had worked in the Bay of Pigs. Some of them had been in Dr. Fielding's office in '71...others were later caught in the Watergate a month afterwards. They hired them to come up from Miami and beat me up on the steps of the Capitol, May 3, 1972. And that order came from the White House.

Dinah: And you have that information for a fact?

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Ellsberg: Jim McGruder has admitted it in his book that he was a part of that chain. He got the order from Colson.

Dinah: But they didn't beat you up...I mean you were...

Ellsberg: Well, these were the people as I said, we sent to overthrow Castro in the Bay of Pigs.

Dinah: Oh, yeah. And open up that little door in the Watergate. Yeah.

Ellsberg: They worked with their usual dedication.

Dinah: And judgment, great yeah, wisdom

Ellsberg: Now, if we could count on that performance every time,

Dinah: We'd be safe all over the world, wouldn't we, yeah.

Ellsberg: We'd be safer...but I'm afraid that that shows that the President can get obedience to break any law if he wants it, and I'm afraid sometimes they've succeeded.

Dinah: Well then, how you must have felt when you learned that your psychiatrist office had been broken into. How did you learn that, by the way?

Ellsberg: It came out in Court. John Dean began saying it to the prosecutors April 15, 1973. We got it in the

5
court...the judge said Dr. Ellsberg...we don't need to release this, you know that you had a psychiatrist once if you don't want. And I said let it go.

Dinah: Well I mean the sin was not yours and being with a psychiatrist that the sin was being...

Ellsberg: It was a pretty embarrassing thing for the Administration to get out obviously...then it came out about the CIA profile and the CIA help to the break-in. And this chain of revelations that lead ultimately to CIA involvement, transgressions, and so forth. A lot of truth came out as a result of the trial that was worthwhile.

Dinah: Do you think if Judge Byrne...and it was Matt Byrne who was presiding at your trial...do you think if he had not exposed the break-in to Dr. Fielding's office that all of this that you would have been, that all of Watergate would have been exposed the way that it was?

Ellsberg: No. Actually it's interesting you ask that...I hadn't been asked that. My opinion is no...because why did they offer Judge Byrne during the trial the directorship of the FBI. It was clearly their desire when that news got to him later...a few weeks later...

Dinah: Did they know he was going to preside on your trial?

Ellsberg: Well, he had been presiding at that time.

Dinah: I didn't realize the trial was on at that time.

Ellsberg: This was the middle of the trial...I was on trial. And I think that it's clear why they offered it.

It was a clear intent of a bribe for something he didn't yet know what was going to be asked of him. It's clear to me that they wanted him to keep quiet about the information he was going to receive, and he very properly of course did reveal it. But had that not come out..or had our trial ended earlier, that was the information that pointed directly to wrongdoing in the Oval Office.

Dinah: Yes.

Ellsberg: See, the other aspects of Watergate...Segretti, the enemy's list...and maybe this lady who was audited by the IRS...I was on the enemy's list at some point because they were hoping to use the IRS that way. All those things stop short of the President in terms of proof. People don't realize that. They went up to the Attorney General who indicted me, Mr. Mitchell, or the next Attorney General who carried on my case, Mr. Kleindeinst, but they didn't prove it on the President. What was proven on the President started

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with Dean's revelations, the plumbers unit that set out to investigate me, that went into the doctor's office, the 17 wiretaps on which was government officials on which I'd been picked up several times, and they had, the FBI had, falsely denied this wiretapping, the CIA profile which violated their statute...all of the these things, the later assault on me, which came according to McGruder from Colson and he said "on orders from the President" and McGruder said "well we'd better do it..sometimes when Colson says it's from the President he's telling the truth. So, because the President had had in this country to take illegal actions, to keep secrets about the war -

Dinah: People began to suspect he had

Ellsberg: in some other country he wouldn't have had to do that - he exposed himself. And because he was caught at that he was removed from office eventually and the war ended. So the anti-war mood of the country that had forced that secrecy, and the anti-war movement of which I was one person, ended the war.

Dinah: Was crystallized in that particular...

Ellsberg: It took a long time.

Dinah: Sure.

31 MAR
not needed

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Public Affairs Office*

Heck-

*I trust you agree we
shouldn't signify much on
Electrolux with a CIA
appearance.*

4/1

Date

Executive Registry
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SUSPENSE 8 APR 77
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Remarks:

Direct reply, please!

31 MAR 77
Date

3637 (7-76)

Pub Affs

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

77-2439

APR 1977

Dear Sirs:

I would like to correct some of the impressions that your readers might have received from the editorial of April 26 entitled, "The CIA and the oil shortage."

The editorial stated that "it came as a shock" that the CIA had "moved into the tricky art of estimating international oil and gas reserves." In fact the CIA report on the "International Energy Situation" did not estimate the size of world oil and gas reserves but rather projected oil demand and supply to 1985. Also, it should not be a "shock" that CIA is involved in the strategic considerations of the world energy situation as part of its intelligence mission. The Central Intelligence Agency has been studying international energy problems since its establishment some 30 years ago. Originally the concentration was on communist nations, but as the world energy shortage and higher prices developed in the 1970's our analytical work in this area was extended to cover other parts of the world. We would be derelict if we did not do so.

CIA's role in analyzing world energy trends is well known by U.S. industry, the trade press, and international agencies concerned with this subject. Indeed, every other week the CIA issues a widely distributed, unclassified statistical survey, "International Oil Developments," (attached) through the Document Expediting Project of the Library of Congress.

It is simply not true that the CIA analysis is "almost alone." Most private and institutional projections of energy supply and demand are quite pessimistic, and in light of our analysis of the USSR and China situations we would expect them to evidence greater pessimism.

We take exception to the remark that CIA has a "tattered credibility" and is "an easy mark for White House manipulation." Our analysts jealously protect their objectivity and neither they nor I would accept manipulation, from any source, including the White House. There is no evidence to the contrary.

I am concerned that at a time I am trying to make as much of our material available to the public as possible you raise the question of motives and credibility. The public should have as much objective information as possible on issues such as the energy situation, and we will continue to declassify such reports on a variety of subjects whenever possible.

/s/ Stanfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Letters to the Editor
The Washington Star
Washington, D.C. 20061

The CIA and the oil shortage

As President Carter has acknowledged, a lot of Americans don't believe in the energy crisis. They think the wolf at the door is phony.

What, then, the President was asked at his press conference April 15, might "jar the consciousness" of skeptics? Well, he said, "the CIA has just completed this week a long and detailed analysis of international oil supplies, natural gas supplies," which he found "quite alarming."

His ensuing decision to declassify and share that report with the American public is not the least interesting feature of last week's consciousness-raising sessions on energy.

It came as a shock, in fact, to most of us that the CIA had moved into the tricky art of estimating international oil and gas reserves. It might be expected, of course, that CIA analysts would take a professional interest in the strategic implications of a contest for oil; and if the CIA is right such a contest might be in the offing. But, is the agency right? Almost alone, it appears, the CIA declares that the Soviet oil industry is "in trouble," that its oil production "will soon peak, possibly as early as next year," that by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union will become a net importer of oil, and thus perhaps a competitor for the oil wealth of the Middle East. Almost alone, again, it predicts a net shortage of oil by 1985.

These predictions, with their ominous implication that the problems of the Middle East might be complicated by East-West oil competition, are, if warranted, of the most startling strategic significance. But, are they true? Or rather, are they authoritative enough to form the basis of a major overhaul of American energy policy?

The predictions are not documented. The White House would say only that the CIA made use of studies by other public agencies; but none of these studies, we are told, is nearly so gloomy about Soviet oil production. And others — for instance, a United Nations study released early this week — flatly discount the CIA's conclusions.

It is at least a timely coincidence that a CIA analysis, said to have been ordered last year, should become available just as the President took his case for conservation to the public. If, as Mr. Carter said, the report was "just completed" it could hardly have been the basis of his energy-saving policy proposals, since they

presumably have been on the drawing boards for many weeks.


Considering all these puzzles, a lot of people are wondering why the CIA's authority (at least, the authority of its name, such as it is) should be invoked. When last we noticed, the CIA suffered from perhaps as much public skepticism as the energy crisis. And one source of its somewhat tattered credibility, according to every recent study, is that in years past the CIA became an easy mark for White House manipulation.

The "CIA says" approach to the world oil crunch, in view of the many conflicting assessments from other sources, may not do much for CIA credibility and its reputation for independence. We do not, for our part, conclude out of hand that the President's invocation of CIA authority is calculatedly "political." We do question the wisdom of using an apparently undocumented intelligence analysis in this fashion.

The natural assumption, we suppose, is that when the CIA does not name the sources of its alarm about a mid-1980s world energy crunch, those sources are confidential. And if so, do not the usual objections to possibly compromising leaks of CIA estimates apply? If, on the other hand, the report merely echoes — with highly disputable worst-case conclusions superadded — already published and publicly available analyses by other hands, what is the point of dragging in the CIA? Does that not raise fears of a return to the bad old days in which the intelligence professionals were suborned and compromised by executive manipulation?

To raise these questions, we hasten to add, is not to question the seriousness of the energy shortfall that forms the premise of the President's warnings. If the coming world shortage is as severe as the CIA report suggests, it will be irrelevant whether the Soviet Union continues to be a marginal exporter, or becomes a marginal importer, of oil in the 1980s. Indeed, one key point in the CIA analysis is that much will depend on the production and export policies of Saudi Arabia.

The immediate American problem is our ungovernable thirst for imported oil, and the need to get it under control. Even a looming strategic rivalry for Middle Eastern oil is, for present purposes, a sideshow: an ominous one, perhaps, but a sideshow all the same.



International Oil Developments

STATISTICAL SURVEY

Prepared by
The Office of Economic Research

ER IOD SS 77-008
21 April 1977

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A0024001100

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Remarks:

Adminal 4-29-77

Here is a letter to the
STAR - commenting on the
editorial —



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CBS
NEWS

A Division of CBS Inc.
2020 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
(202) 457-4321

Executive Regi

77-6705

Dear Admiral Turner:

April 28, 1977

Thanks so much for being on FACE THE NATION a few weeks ago. It was timely and very newsworthy. Enclosed is a photo to remind you of the event.

It was a pleasure to see and talk with you again in your office before my grand tour of the CIA which I enjoyed immensely. Thank you for that too.

Hope you will be on FACE THE NATION again soon.


Sincerely,

Mary

Mary O. Yates
Producer
FACE THE NATION

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

26 April 1977

Mr. & Mrs. Roger A. Beane

Dear Roger and Ruth:

Angie joins me in thanking you for your kind letter of 17 April. I am glad that you found my address to the Petersburg Rotarian session to be worthwhile. We certainly felt privileged to be in your midst.

May our paths cross again. We very much enjoyed getting to know you both.

All the best.

Faithfully yours,


E. H. Knoche

77-3864/2A

*Filed
D. H. Knoche
Public Affairs*

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Public Affairs



ROTARY INTERNATIONAL

Service Above Self - He Profits Most Who Serves Best

1944 BURKS STREET • PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA 23803

ROGER A. BEANE
GOVERNOR DISTRICT 760

DOE
Pub. Affairs
26 Apr 77

TELEPHONE
(804) 733-0623

17 April 1977

Hon. E. H. Knoche, Deputy Director
Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Hank:

Please forgive the informality of address, however I somehow felt very close to you and may hopefully consider you a newly found friend, as did Ruth.

She so appreciated the Chinese expression of friendship which you wrote on her ticket plus the afterthought.

On the equally sincere side, we could not have been more pleased or more favorably impressed not only with the content of your address but especially your so obvious and completely disarming candor. Your handling of the questions from the floor made a tremendous impression, lending such confidence to all that many later told me they slept much more soundly that night in the knowledge that we had someone like you in such a sensitive and significant governmental role. I feel that way, too.

Certainly you must have felt the rapport which existed between you and the audience. You literally had us in the palm of your hand. We shall long remember the occasion as the highlight, truly, of our Annual District Conference in Rotary.

I cannot sign off without mentioning what a delight it was to have Angie come with you. Somehow I imagine that islands of respite and some relaxation together are sometimes too far apart. May the good Lord keep you and your family warm in His love and safe in the palm of His hand.

Most sincerely,

Roger A. Beane
Roger A. Beane




ROTARY INTERNATIONAL

ROGER A. BEANE • GOVERNOR ELECT DISTRICT 760 • 1976-1977
1944 BURKS STREET - PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA 23803



Hon. E. H. Knoche, Deputy Director
Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505



APR 21 11 16 AM

97-7257/2

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CBS Who's Who

1. This is an elaboration of the principal considerations involved in the decision on the merits of having a CIA segment of Who's Who. Both favorable and unfavorable views have been briefly expressed and documented in the memoranda by the participants in the April 11 meeting with CBS producer David Buksbaum, and Herb Hetu's memorandum (April 18) to the DCI summarizes basic staff positions and recommends DCI approval of the CBS request.

2. Supporting considerations:

a. A personality-oriented program would capitalize on the newsworthiness of the new DCI.

b. The producers of the program are ready to accommodate our security restrictions and requirements.

c. A fast-moving, "newsy" program, still riding its newness, and popular with a sizeable audience, provides a good vehicle for a few selected positive points about the CIA.


3. Opposing considerations:

a. At this juncture, particularly after the DCI has already been exposed personally on CBS Face the Nation, our objective should be to seek ways of giving the public an accurate and credible representation of the intelligence profession, its processes and institutions. We should put emphasis on getting a network (perhaps PBS) to do a serious documentary on American intelligence and the CIA.

b. There is universal concern about setting a precedent for press access that would become difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in the future. Holding out for a documentary approach would reduce competitive pressure; conversely, admitting one network to inside filming for the purpose

of a Who's Who type of feature would set a precedent for future topical requests from the visual media. This is not the kind of openness that we seek or that the public demands.

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Let's go - Bart

ST

25 APR 1977

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

I asked my staff to get together with the Directorate Deputies to flesh out a bit more of the pros and cons of this proposal. I hope these will be helpful to you in deciding whether to proceed with it.



E. H. Knoche

P.S. My own view is that it would be preferable for the program to be an informal "at-the-Turner-home" interview, off Agency premises.

Date 22 April 1977

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Washington, D.C. 20505

25 April 1977

Mr. John D. Goodin
Chairman, Past National
Commanders Organization
611 W. Walnut St.
Johnson City, Tenn. 37601


Dear Mr. Goodin,

Thank you for your letter of April 20 and your telephone call. This is to confirm our arrangement for a briefing for 30-50 persons at our Headquarters Building at Langley on the outskirts of Washington, at 1000 hours on Friday, May 6.

As indicated in my phone conversation, we will need as soon as possible but no later than the morning of May 5, the names, with place and date of birth, of those attending. There should be no cameras or tape recorders.

It was nice talking with you.

Sincerely,


Deputy Assistant for Public Affairs

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